practitioners and relevant NGOs. The combined information indicates that our overall findings broadly reflect the preliminary findings based solely on the information provided by the Central Authorities. 9 The quantitative findings were analysed through the SPSS system. In addition to the collection of quantitative data interviews were carried out with judges and practitioners in five selected Member States in order to gain further information on those States and identify any practical issues that arose when applying the Regulation in Member States, and follow up on information gathered through cases files. These States were: Belgium, Latvia, The
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK (predominantly England and Wales). 10 These States were chosen primarily because of the number of proceedings, however we also took account of geographical location (Latvia), and States which had interesting proceedings with other Member States (Portugal). Various attempts were made to carry out interviews in Italy but unfortunately this was not possible.
C. Findings

General findings on Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa
The findings indicate that there were at least 66 applications, concerning 70 children, which involved Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings since the date of entry into force of Brussels IIa until June 2015. 11 The consolidated information indicates that the Article 11(6)- (8) proceedings were distributed as follows:
Member State
Number of Article 11(6)- It is slightly strange that the vast majority of cases, 91 per cent, involved only one child. The official figures from 2008 showed that more than one child was involved in 31 per cent of Hague cases. 12 Kruger's findings show that abductions occur more often in small families, which she suggests makes sense from a logistical point of view, as it is much easier to organise the abduction of a single child. 13 In the present study around half of the children were six years old and under, 14 and in the majority of cases the abducting parent was returning to the State of their nationality with the child. The majority of abducting parents were female, with 83 per cent of cases where the abducting parent was the mother. In one case the abductions were carried out by the aunt, 15 in the other cases the findings show that the abductions were carried out by the child's mother or father.
This finding of 83 per cent of abductions being by the mother is much higher than in other studies. In Kruger's study her overall finding was that 65.2 per cent of abductors were female.
Broken down this results in 61.9 per cent in abductions from Belgium (67.9 per cent for intra-EU cases), and 71.8 per cent for abductions to Belgium (72.2 per cent for intra-EU). Therefore the current findings may indicate an increase in female abductors in recent years, however it is recognised that the present study looks only at specific cases, rather than all abduction applications. The findings could be a sign that the court in the State of refuge is more likely to issue a non-return order where the abducting parent is the mother. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of the 2008 study where 17 per cent of applications for return were refused where the mother was the abductor, and only 11 per cent where the abductor was the father. In relation to Article 13(1)(b) Hague specifically, return was refused where the mother was the abductor in 30 per cent of cases and only 15 per cent where the abducting parent was the father. 18 An alternative theory, that may also play a part, is that mothers are likely to have less financial stability than fathers so they might not have the resources available to begin Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings as legal aid is unlikely to be available. 
Article 13 Hague refusals that resulted in Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings
A key finding is that in half the cases that resulted in Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings the non-return was ordered on the basis of Article 13(1)(b) Hague grave risk of harm. 20 Of these 32 cases the abducting parent was the mother in 30. There were a further seven cases where the non-return was ordered on the basis of grave risk, combined with the child's objections, 21 and two cases where it was combined with one of the provisions in Article 13(1)(a). 17 K Trimmings, Child Abduction within the European Union (Hart Publishing, 2013) 79. This study looks only at intra-EU abduction applications made under Brussels IIa. 18 N Lowe and V Stephens, supra n 12, 63. However cf Lowe and Stephens' findings on Art 13(2) Hague where the opposite is the case. 19 For more information on legal aid in this context, see below at Section E, 2. 20 Hague Convention of 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Art 13(1)(b). 21 Ibid, Arts 13(1)(b) and 13(2). In the other studies on child abduction, 22 data on judicial refusals cover all reasons that a judge can rely on to refuse return including, lack of habitual residence, lack of custody rights, 23 the child has settled in their new environment and more than one year had elapsed after the abduction before the return proceedings were instituted 24 and that the return would be in breach of fundamental rights. 25 Therefore the information is not necessarily comparable. It is also recognised that the current study only looks at Article 13 Hague non-returns that have developed into Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings, rather than all Article 13 Hague nonreturns across the EU. 26 However, where quantities for each of the judicial refusals are given, 22 N Lowe (1999, 2003, 2008) see for example N Lowe and V Stephens, supra n 12, 41 and K Trimmings, supra n 17. 23 Both precursors for the operation of the Convention, Arts 3 and 4. 24 Art 12(2). 25 Art 20. 26 The aim was to collect statistics on all Art 13 Hague non-returns so that we could determine how many of these resulted in Art 11 (6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings, however we were unable to collect this information new percentages have been given in order to generate some comparative data. In Trimming's intra-EU study, Article 13(1)(b) refusals accounted for 54 per cent of Article 13 refusals so slightly above that found in the present study. 27 In the 2008 global study 48 per cent of the Article 13 judicial refusals were based on Article 13(1)(b), which is just below the current finding of 49.2 per cent. 28 Lowe and Stephens suggest that the steep rise in Article 13(1) (b) refusals is a European phenomenon, and refer particularly to Poland. 29 Our findings suggest that this is a general trend not restricted to Poland.
State of Refuge
Reason for Article 13 non-return Total across the Member States due to a poor return from Central Authorities; and the collection of this data over the entire period went beyond what we could ask of the independent researcher in each Member State, who kindly assisted us by locating Art 11(6)-(8) proceedings. Unpublished data provided to us by the European Commission on Art 11(6) transmissions that went through Central Authorities (Art 11(6) provides that all documents must be transmitted to the State of origin following an Art 13 Hague non-return order, but these can be sent directly to the Court) suggests that there were at least 31 Art 13 non-return orders in 2014, 49 in 2013 and 64 in 2012; indicating a possible decrease in Art 13 non-return orders, compared to a slight increase in abduction applications (821 (2012), 898 (2013) and 885 (2014) . However the data provided by the Commission is incomplete as not all Member States responded. Despite this, the information suggests that there was a possibility to initiate Art 11(7) or (8) The Polish courts did issue a number of Article 13(1)(b) non-returns but when Poland is excluded Article 20 Brussels IIa preserves for the courts in "urgent cases" the powers that they have under their national law to take "provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that State". This Article has been given a very restrictive application by the CJEU. 34 Under Article 11 of the 1996 Convention 35 a court that is deciding whether to order a return of an abducted child in cases where that child might be at a grave risk of harm or might otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation if returned to the country of the child's habitual residence without any safeguards, can take the "urgent" step of ordering "necessary" protective measures. These could include that the left-behind parent cannot see the child alone and perhaps only with the supervision of a public authority. Such an "urgent" measure has the advantage that it will be recognised by operation of law in the State where the child is being returned to, 36 but will lapse "as soon as the authorities" in the State of the child's habitual residence "have taken the measures required by the situation". 37 The 1996 Convention improves upon the system of mutual trust that exists under the 1980 Convention whereby judges are encouraged to assume that the authorities in the State of the child's habitual residence will take the necessary measures to protect a child from physical or sexual abuse.
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In cases where that trust has broken down or not been properly established judges may not take the risk of returning children under the 1980 Convention. The 1996 Convention gives the judges in the State where the child is present the confidence that they can order any "necessary"
protection measures which will be recognised in the State of the child's habitual residence (if it is also a party to the 1996 Convention) in the crucial period when the child is returning to that country (usually with the abducting parent) before the courts there have a chance to deal with the case.
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In a case where the child concerned has his or her habitual residence on the territory of an EU Member State the rules in the 1996 Convention can only apply within the European Union "in relation to matters not governed by this Regulation." (Article 62(1) of Brussels IIa).
Does Article 11(1) of the 1996 Convention concern "a matter not governed by" the Brussels Convention in the jurisdiction it grants to the courts where the child is present and/or in the recognition and enforcement provided within the EU to the protective measures granted by those courts. Whichever route is adopted the Regulation could, and should, go further than the scope of Article 11 of the 1996 Convention and also include a provision, which allows urgent protective measures for the returning abducting parent (usually the mother). This should include financial support to allow him or her to return and the provision of a safe place to live until the courts in the State of origin have given a decision on the child's custody and residence.
As 'mutual trust' already exists in the EU it should be relatively simple to require that these orders are automatically enforceable in the State of the habitual residence of the child until a court there has an opportunity to decide the issues for itself. 43 The study shows that Article 13(1)(b) Hague is used more often than the other Article 13 exceptions, and often used incorrectly in relation to the failure to take account of Article . 42 It is of course acknowledged that there will be some cases where it is necessary to refuse the return of the child on the basis of Art 13(1)(b) in order to protect the child, but judges are often failing to utilise these additional provisions that could help in certain cases. 43 objections it is particularly difficult to justify allowing the courts of the habitual residence of the child before the abduction to give a decision on residence which requires the child to live in that State with the non-abducting parent, given the strong evidence in our study that these orders are being made without hearing the child and the greater practical difficulty for the courts of the habitual residence to hear the child in abduction cases compared to the courts of the State of refuge. . 59 In some cases this is because the outcome was still pending when the information was provided or in other cases there had been an initial hearing and then the judge had referred a question to the judge in the State of refuge and no further proceedings could be found. In some cases the judges issued a final order requiring the return of the child, 60 and in other cases the judges issued a provisional decision in order for them to hold a full custody, or welfare, hearing following the child's return. 61 The main reason for doing this was because the judges had been unable to hear the parties, so they ordered the return so that all parties could be heard sufficiently. 62 In some cases the parties had been given numerous opportunities to be heard, 63 however in other cases no attempt had been made to hear the parties and in one specific case the certificate was issued so that the parties 'will' be given an opportunity to be heard, on their return. 64 In such cases the validity of the certificate has to be questioned because the point in the certificate is to certify that the parties 'were' given an opportunity to be heard. 65 In other cases Article 11(6)- (8) Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings should not be used simply to review the Article 13 Hague decision on non-return. This does not promote mutual trust. Article 11 (7) states that the parties are invited to make submissions to the court so that the 'court can examine the question of custody of the child'. There is nothing in Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa that suggests the court should review the Article 13 Hague decision. In order to issue a certificate under Article 42 Brussels IIa the court is supposed to take account of the reasons for and evidence underlying the Hague non-return order, 68 but this is a procedural safeguard for protecting the child, due to the abolition of exequatur, rather than reviewing the decision on non-return (which is the job of an appellate court). Any decision taken by the court of the habitual residence of the child under Article 11(6)- (8) should be a full welfare assessment that takes account of the best interests of the child. It is recognised that in Povse the CJEU held that the court can order the return of the child for the purpose of custody proceedings, 69 but this does not allow courts to order the return of the child just because they will not be at a grave risk of harm. 70 Any decision under Article 11(6)- (8) should only be made after a best interest of the child assessment is carried out. These proceedings are not the same as summary return proceedings that should be taken urgently and where evidence should be kept to a minimum.
Instead a much broader assessment should be made, evidence should be collected and the parties should be heard. 71 It is clear that the proceedings are different to the earlier summary proceedings as no timeframe is set, 72 and judges are supposed to meet the requirements in 71 At least they should be given an opportunity to be heard. 72 Art 11(3) introduces a six week deadline in respect of Hague Convention cases. No deadline was introduced in relation to Art 11(6)-(8) judicial proceedings (only for notifying the court of the non-return order and initiating an application under Art 11(7)) suggesting that the nature of the order is different. If both proceedings were designed to be summary, although Art 11(7) suggests to the contrary, then it would have been possible to include timelines for both sets of proceedings. 73 Child and family court advisory and support service, England and Wales. Cafcass officers are professionals (mostly social workers) who speak to children to try and determine their wishes and feelings in order to provide a report for the court on the child's welfare.
when the child is in another Member State and collect the evidence required to make an adequate assessment. 74 Unfortunately this does not appear to be happening regularly, the proceedings are not being treated in the same way across the EU, and Article 42 certificates are being issued where there are distinct differences in analysis by courts. 75 The cases where the judge in the State of origin reached a decision requiring return and an Article 42 certificate was issued can be broken down to distinguish between final and interim orders; and to distinguish between cases where there was a full welfare analysis and where there was not. The results indicate that a number of the decisions in which an Article 42 certificate was issued were intended to be final orders, but only a small number of these cases could be considered to be decided as a result of a full welfare analysis.
Type of 11 (8) 75 Compare the decision in Bradbrooke supra n 33, where the Belgian Court of Appeal made a detailed analysis of the child's interests including his needs and the benefits of maintaining a relationship with both his parents for his full development, with an Italian decision where the judge considered that even if the children opposed the return they should be returned anyway if they were not at risk of harm (n 70). In both cases an Art 42 certificate was issued. 76 This refers to cases which meet all the requirements in Art 42 and cases where the judge made the best of a bad situation. Cases that do not meet the requirements in Art 42 and cases which just review the Art 13 provisions do not meet the standards of a full welfare analysis. For further information see section D below and the country reports.
There were only five cases in which orders were made, that were intended to be final orders,
where it is clear that a full welfare analysis was carried out. In seven of the cases where the Article 11(8) order was intended to be a final order a full welfare analysis was not carried out, and in the remaining case the answer is unclear.
Due to the divergent treatment of Article 11 (6) however any order should reflect the reality of the situation 79 and must be practical. Children have to have a main residence, particularly once they start school, as it is impractical for them to spend half the year in one school system and the other half of the year in another incompatible school system. It is also apparent that in many of these cases the parties do not have a lot of money. In many cases the parties cannot afford to be making weekly trips across Europe, and in the case of younger children the child cannot travel alone, so one of the parents will need to take time off work to make the trip. 80 This is perhaps not such a big problem in socalled 'big money' cases because the parents might be able to reach some sort of agreement where the child spends the majority of their time at boarding school and splits the remainder of their time equally with both parents, some agreement is made in relation to maintenance or 77 .The judge must be satisfied that it is in the best interests of the child to live with an appropriate custodian , where it was decided that contact should take place twice a year for 7-10 days at a time). As Herring and Taylor explain one reason that parents relocate in the first place is to escape financial instability and be closer to family support networks in order to protect the future well-being of themselves and their child. J Herring and R Taylor, supra n 76, 523.
one parent is happy to and can easily afford to make the trip to see the child regularly. In any case judges need to reach a practical decision that is in the best interests of the child, and works for the parties, which will most likely involve the child spending the majority of their time with one parent in one Member State.
(b) Implementation
A return was ordered in 28 Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa cases, however the order was only definitely implemented in 7 cases. In the remainder of these cases, the child was not returned to the State of origin in 14 cases and the outcome is unknown in 7 cases. Consequently out of the 28 orders, which are automatically enforceable because they were accompanied by an Article 42 certificate, only 25 per cent of these orders were implemented and only 18 per cent were enforced legally. In relation to the five orders that were enforced legally the enforcing States (States of refuge) were Malta, 81 Poland, Portugal (on two occasions) and Slovenia. In the five cases where the order was legally enforced, three of these orders were final orders, in the other two cases the type of order was unknown. In two out of the five cases a full welfare analysis was carried out; 82 in the other three cases the depth of the analysis by the court is unknown. In relation to the two re-abductions one order was final and the other order was interim.
The findings show that Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings are largely ineffective as the orders are rarely enforced legally, despite the fact that they are automatically enforceable.
These findings coincide with the outcome in the two well-known cases in this area: Aguirre 86 In Bradbrooke there had been ongoing proceedings in Belgium for contact but the question of relocation does not seem to have been raised. It is known that in some cases parents carefully plan an abduction which they know is contrary to the law. However there are a variety of reasons why a parent may not seek a relocation order before relocation. They might not realise they are supposed to do this, certain national laws might not be favourable to relocation, the parent might be fleeing domestic violence and leaving when they have a chance, or they might not be able to pay for the procedure. In TQ13P00079/ZC14P00064 EWHC (Fam) 4 July 2014 (Unreported), the mother had intended to seek a relocation order (which would most likely have been granted). She then discovered that she would not receive legal aid for her application, she could not afford a lawyer, so she left without the courts' permission. Given the legal aid cuts and the limits on access to justice the actions of these parents are sometimes understandable. This perceived saving in government funding, due to legal aid cuts within the UK, can result in ongoing proceedings and increased animosity between the parties, which may result in more spending in the long run and increased instability for the parties.
where the father re-abducted the child was Rinau, 87 a case also dealt with by the CJEU. Given the problems surrounding the Article 11(6)- (8) 
Hearing the child
Under international law, a child has a right to be given the opportunity to be heard in situations that affect them. 95 The requirement to give the child the opportunity to be heard during the course of civil legal proceedings is found within Article 12 (2) EU case '(…) it shall be ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity.' 97 Brussels IIa went further still to protect the right of the child to be heard in that the enforcement of the return order under Articles 11(8) and 42 is conditional on the child having been given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings, unless this is inappropriate.
98
This was seen as a necessary requirement in light of the abolition of the exequatur. . 97 Art 11(2) Brussels IIa Regulation. Under the 1980 Hague Convention there is no explicit requirement to give the child an opportunity to be heard during return proceedings. There is the possibility for the child to object to being returned under Art 13(2) of the 1980 Convention and the court can issue a non-return order on that basis if it feels that the objection is valid with regard to the age and maturity of the child; implying that the child has been given the opportunity to be heard in order to be able to express their objection. 98 Art 42(2)(a) Brussels IIa Regulation. As the standard is set autonomously in the Regulation without any reference to national law it is for the CJEU to give guidance on what is "inappropriate" when the matter is referred to that Court by a national court. A broad approach should be taken to ensure conformity with Art 12 UNCRC whereby each child's maturity is assessed when the child is heard rather than having an arbitrary age requirement as happens under some national laws in the EU. 99 In relation to other parental responsibility orders Art 23 (2) information was unavailable. The submission of an Article 42 certificate does not guarantee that the child has been heard, however, according to the information provided only 20 per cent of the children were heard indirectly and none directly. It also seems that whether a court chooses to hear the child or not can be influenced by their desire merely to comply with the Article 42 certificate. In one case, the court openly stated that they had requested the children to be heard in the State of refuge simply to satisfy the requirements of the Article 42 certificate so that the children could be ordered to return. 106 In another, the court decided that the child was too young to be heard, however stated that the child would be heard on his return to Ireland.
The real reason that the child was not heard in the State of refuge was that the court in the State of origin did not have the means to interview the child in Poland and that it intended to do a full welfare hearing on his return. In some cases the box was ticked but the child was not actually heard. It is unclear whether an initial application was made under the Taking of Evidence Regulation in all cases.
Unfortunately, the present findings also highlight a problem with the courts accessing the equipment required that would support the Taking of Evidence Regulation. Access to videoconferencing facilities was difficult in many cases and often hindered by long waiting lists or complicated bureaucracy to obtain access to it.
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Interestingly there appears to be a link between the child being heard and the decision, Figure 9: hearing the child and the final decision 109 Belgium reported a difficulty in accessing video-conferencing facilities for abduction cases. In Belgium video-conferencing is available for criminal cases but not civil cases and the procedure to organise it is complex. Portugal noted that even though they had requested video-conferencing facilities to be made available under the urgent procedure so that they could hear the abducting party in the Netherlands that the Netherlands could not offer a slot within 8 weeks of the request. See the country reports for Belgium and Portugal. 110 In this case the order has never been enforced, and the child has been moved several times by the father in order to avoid enforcement. She is now in a State outside the EU (information provided by a local researcher and a lawyer, please see the English and Welsh country report for further details In three of the cases where an opportunity was given, but this was not acted upon, the court issued an Article 42 certificate requiring the return of the child. It is questionable whether the 'opportunity' given in Aguirre Zarraga was a genuine opportunity, 113 however because the certificate accompanying the judgment is currently unreviewable, the judge in the State of origin is free to assess whether an 'opportunity' has been given, with no clear guidelines on whether this requirement has actually been fulfilled.
(b) Reasons for not hearing the child (i) Age and maturity of the child
The age and degree of maturity of the child could justify why these children were not being heard. The cases where the child was heard, or observed, concerned children aged between two and fourteen. However out of the 57 cases where the age of the child was identifiable only 23, or 40 per cent, of the children were five years of age and under, and therefore could in some cases be correctly regarded as not having the requisite age or maturity where it would be appropriate to hear the child. 114 Age alone should not be decisive, though, particularly in welfare proceedings and States should ensure that children are heard or observed through suitable mechanisms, 115 and judges read reports on the child's family situation, produced by relevant practitioners. At the other end of the spectrum 33 children were aged between six and fifteen. 116 It is suggested that these children do have the requisite age to be heard. Courts can only determine whether children have the maturity to be heard if they hear the child through an appropriate mechanism, and at that stage the judge can decide how much weight to give to the child's views. 117 Courts have a duty under international law and EU law to hear children in 113 Aguirre Zarraga supra n 58, and see supra n 105 above. 114 In Re W (Abduction: Child's Objections) [2010] EWCA Civ 520 a 6 year old child was considered to have age and maturity for their objection to return to be taken into consideration for non-return. Cafcass regard a child as having the age and maturity to be heard from the age of 6, in Hague Convention proceedings (information provided at an interview on 6 October 2015). 115 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has indicated that all children, including infants, should be heard through a mechanism that is appropriate for their age, see UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, . 116 In addition there is a case where the exact age of the child is unknown, but the child was at least seven years old, the child was not heard and an Art 42 certificate was issued. This is clear because the date of the abduction was seven years before the Art 11(8) proceedings. It took the father five years to initiate Hague proceedings in Poland (it is suggested he did complain of the abduction earlier but did not utilise the Hague Convention), so it is unclear why Art 11(8) applied as jurisdiction is lost under Art 10 if the parent does not make a Hague application within a year of them knowing where the child is (the child was with her grandparents in Poland The findings indicate that children as old as 15 were not heard even when the reason for their non-return was based on the child's objection. 118 Even if consideration is given to the fact that some Member States will only hear the child from above the age of 12, 119 this would still leave children have the age and maturity to be heard, they should be heard and then judges should exercise their discretion when determining how much weight should be given to these views and whether they should be decisive. 118 Italy country report -CA No 149/12. In a Portuguese case (207DE2010) the child was aged 14 when abducted to France. During Hague proceedings the French court refused to return the child based on the child's objections. The Portuguese court then ordered the return of the child under Art 11(8) Brussels IIa and the Portuguese judge did not hear the child, much to the concern of the French Central Authority. The implementation of the order was delayed (because the French court ordered further psychological reports) to the extent that the child is now 18 years old and remains in France. 119 These national laws do not comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child as it is inflexible to automatically presume that children under a certain age are incapable of expressing their views in an appropriate way.
General Comment no. 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood
9 children over the age of 12 who were not heard. Giving the child the opportunity to be heard does not mean that their view has to be followed. The courts have discretion as to the weight they give to the child's views, and therefore at the very least these children should have had the opportunity to be heard, particularly as it is a requirement under Article 42.
(
ii) Hearing the child in another Member State
There are more obstacles to gathering evidence on a child who is in another Member State, and hearing a child when they are in that State, but it is clear that this is possible. In some cases children can be heard via video-link, in other cases welfare officers in the State of refuge can produce reports on the child and in other cases welfare officers from the State of origin will already have written reports as part of the ongoing custody proceedings or will travel to the State of refuge to write their report. In some English cases it has been necessary for a Cafcass officer or Children's Guardian to travel to the State of refuge to hear the child and observe them there. In these circumstances an officer would aim to go abroad and conduct all the necessary enquiries over a 2-3 day period. 120 Children of all ages are observed in their family surroundings. Older children are seen independently. The aim is to see them in a variety of contexts, such as school and their home as well as in a neutral environment such as a café in order to put the child at ease, try to get an accurate understanding of their home life and uncover the child's true feelings. 121 Although this is a short period of time, the interviewees indicated that they would be unlikely to spend much more time than this with a child in national proceedings, due to pressure from judges to deal with cases quickly. 122 The one key difference, between national and international cases, is that if later on the Cafcass officer feels unsure about something and wants to double check a particular point they are unable to do this in cross-border cases. They only get one chance to gather all the information necessary for their report.
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Cafcass officers also indicated that in certain circumstances, the gathering of evidence abroad might be offensive to the national social services in that State and that the authorities from the State of origin might not always be the best people to hear the child due to differences in cultural norms. 124 However this has to be balanced by the need to obtain a report that meets (
iii) Impact of the abducting parent on the child's right to be heard
Another possible reason why a child has not been given the opportunity to be heard is because the abducting parent has chosen not to cooperate in the proceedings; a behaviour that has serious consequences for the child's right to be heard, even though this behaviour is permitted. 126 This behaviour places the court in a difficult position. If the court makes efforts to hear the child this risks delaying the proceedings, and if it does not issue an Article 42 certificate as a result of the abducting parent's negative behaviour then this has a significant impact on the right to a fair trial and right to family life of the left-behind parent.
(c) The Article 42 certificate
The Article 42 certificate at present cannot be reviewed which is unfortunate because these certificates are often issued incorrectly, as can be seen by the fact that in the 38 cases where the child was clearly not heard, the courts still issued the Article 42 certificate. The weakness 125 Ibid. 126 Art 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) provides a right to an effective remedy before a tribunal, and entitlement to a fair and public hearing. However, if a person chooses not to participate in those proceedings, when invited to do so, then this does not mean that the proceedings cannot or should not continue.
This was evident in D v N and D (By her Guardian ad Litem,) [2011] EWHC 471 (Fam).
lies in Point 11 of the certificate that asks the court to affirm that: 'The children were given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered inappropriate having regard to their age or degree of maturity'. A simple affirmation is not sufficient to protect the right of the child to be heard. Instead the certificate should state what the opportunities were, when they were offered; and if the child did not take the opportunity to be heard the reasons why they did not should be stated clearly. Similarly where the judge decided it was inappropriate to hear the child, they should have to give reasons indicating why they reached this decision. It is extremely important that both the certificate and the judgment contains this information, currently this is not happening. There should be minimum standards that apply to the judgment and the certificate. Imposing the need for clarity upon the courts should improve the protection of this fundamental right.
(d) Conclusion
The overall data indicates that the child was definitely heard in only 20 per cent of cases. When looking at cases where the child was six years or over (in cases where the ages are known), only nine out of 33 children, or 27 per cent, of these children were heard. This means that on the basis of the information provided 72 per cent of children aged six and over were not heard. 127 Only four children aged 5 or younger out of a total of 24 children in that age group were heard, 16 of these children fall within the ages of 3 -5 years. When the Regulation was initially amended to support the right of the child to be heard this was greeted with understandable optimism. 128 However this study shows that the right of the child to be given the opportunity to be heard is not being protected. It is understood that the right for the child to be heard in such difficult circumstances should be handled with great sensitivity, however automatic age requirements should not be created. Instead the focus should be on the provision of the necessary tools, environment and suitable training to allow the child's voice to be heard, where appropriate in relation to their maturity, by the correct people and with the minimum of harm to the child. Just as important as hearing the child is the child's understanding of the proceedings, the opportunity for a third party to explain to the child exactly what is happening to them and allow the child to ask questions with the knowledge that the child will get an impartial answer. If the child has the capacity to understand the situation and is able to express a view, then this should be respected, by allowing the child to express those views. However, not all children will want to accept the opportunity to be heard as they may not want to be seen to be effectively taking sides. This is a burden that a child should not have to carry and the decision not to express a view should be respected.
Onus must be placed on the State of origin to train those who will hear the child so that they have the skills to enquire without harming the child. They should also have a proper understanding of how Brussels IIa Article 11(6)- (8) operates. Judges should explain in their judgment, and within an Article 42 certificate, by what method, where and when they gave the child the opportunity to be heard. Where the child was not heard the judgment and the certificate should justify why the child was not given the opportunity to be heard, and this
should not be justified on the basis of age alone. There should be a reasonable explanation as to why a judge thought the child was too young to be heard if this was the reason why the judge deemed it to be inappropriate.
Hearing the abducting parent
The information received on hearing the parents is not as complete as the information provided on proceedings in general. The case law, where available, suggests that it is difficult to hear the abducting parent in these proceedings. There are 19 cases where the parent was definitely heard through some mechanism (30 per cent), and ten cases where the parent was given an 'opportunity' to be heard but was ultimately not heard. This results in at least 27 cases where the abducting parent was not heard. The problem with this is that an 'opportunity' to be heard is not being treated consistently throughout the EU. In some cases clear opportunities are given but the parent refuses to cooperate. This may be because they are given poor legal advice, they do not have access to legal aid, they do not believe that the court in the State of origin has jurisdiction, they no longer trust the courts and the justice system in that State 129 (or the justice system in general) or a combination of these factors. There seems to be an idea that if you ignore the problem for long enough it will disappear but that is not necessarily the case. 130 In these cases attempts have been made to hear parents either via video-link, 131 or through their solicitor. Where the parent has still failed to cooperate, despite numerous chances, judges have gone on to make a decision in the absence of the parent and their representative (if they have one). 132 In these cases the approach taken by the judge is understandable as the abducting parent has effectively negated their right to be heard through lack of cooperation. 133 The ECtHR has held that where an applicant has clearly waived their right to be heard, then to continue the trial in their absence is not a violation of Article 6 ECHR. 134 Unfortunately for the child, this means that any decisions are not necessarily in their best interests, and where a summary return is ordered the instability for the child is prolonged. In other cases almost no effort was made to hear the parents either because the judge seemed to be taking an easy option, 135 or because the court refused to hear the parent via any mechanism other than in person. 136 Service of documents alone might be considered as an 'opportunity', by some judges, in the sense that the parties were aware of the proceedings so they could be heard. This should be deemed insufficient for these purposes, as the party may not have received the documents if they were served at the wrong address and this cannot be reviewed at the enforcement stage, unlike in Brussels I (revised).
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This divergence of what is currently being considered an 'opportunity' across Member
States is unacceptable, questions the effectiveness and reliability of the certificate and should not be allowed to continue. All judges have to do is state "yes" to points 11, 12 and 13. 138 There is then a valid certificate which makes the judgment it accompanies automatically enforceable and is non-reviewable, 139 regardless of the approach taken by the judge. . 140 Weller has argued that 'control is only effective if exercised by someone other than the one to be controlled.' This could suggest that the control mechanism in Art 42 is ineffective as it is being carried out by the judge issuing the decision (Weller, supra n 54, 71). 141 Annex IV, point 12.
142 Annex IV, point 13. 143 Annex IV, point 11. 144 Although this is clear from some decisions, this is not always the case so this additional information is necessary.
When analysing whether abducting parents were heard it is interesting to look at the outcome of the Article 11(6)-(8) proceedings. In fact where parties were given an 'opportunity' to be heard but did not cooperate an Article 42 certificate was issued in 70 per cent of cases. The information collected suggests that courts are less likely to issue an Article 42 certificate where the parties have been heard. Given that one purpose of the certificate is to protect the parties' rights, including the right to be heard, in relation to the abolition of exequatur this finding is slightly obtuse. One positive that could be taken from this finding is that abducting parents are generally better off where they cooperate with the courts in the State of origin during these proceedings. 145 These findings should encourage practitioners to tell parties to cooperate rather than giving them poor legal advice, essentially telling them to ignore the proceedings.
Not only is the abducting parent more likely to get the desired result but it is also better for the 145 It has been suggested that some parents do not cooperate because they know that they have no chance of success. Although this might have been the case in Re A supra n 60, the opposite was true in Bradbrooke supra n 33, where if the mother had cooperated the child would have been permitted to remain in Poland. In either case the best outcome will be reached where all parties are involved and cooperate in proceedings.
child as stability will be regained sooner and the judge will be able to make a better assessment of the child's family situation if all the parties have been heard via some mechanism. It could also be seen as supporting mutual trust, in the sense that when both judges have access to the relevant information they reach the same result (although one when making a summary decision and the other when giving a full welfare decision). Therefore in addition to requiring further information in the judgment and the certificate, a revised Regulation should try and increase facilities for hearing parties.
One key finding over the course of this study has been the lack of ready availability of video-conferencing equipment. It has been reported that the facilities can be very difficult to access, 146 or there can be long delays. 147 A Member State that has good video-conferencing facilities is Latvia. They have at least one set of equipment in each court building, as a result of some funding they received. 148 Unfortunately, this useful technology has not been used in civil proceedings thus far. As delegates have reported many problems relating to hearing parties through video-conferencing equipment, either because of hurdles at their end or lengthy delays in other Member States, it might be useful to create an additional mechanism for hearing abducting parents. One method of doing this could be through Central Authorities. 149 A revised
Regulation, or clear guidance in a Practice Guide, could require Central Authorities to have a room with video-conferencing equipment. This would create a safe place for abducting parents to go and be heard by the judge in the other Member State. The other benefit of this is that a representative from the Central Authority, who should be a practising lawyer, 150 will be able to give some legal advice to abducting parents, 151 inform them that the courts in the State of origin do still have jurisdiction, that they are more likely to get a favourable result if they speak to the judge and whether they are likely to qualify for legal aid. Although Central Authorities should not be overworked, this could easily operate on a scheme where abducting parents facing Article 11(6)- (8) A reason for this, in addition to the ones referred to above is that sometimes the abducting parent is also facing criminal proceedings in the State of origin which also means they are not inclined to cooperate. In Belgium they tend to issue fines and a common approach when issuing Art 11(8) decisions accompanied by an Art 42 certificate is to suggest that the abducting parent will be fined €500 a day for every day that they do not return with the child. This seems to be counter-productive as none of the parents can actually afford this and rather than acting as an incentive to return it appears to alienate the abducting parent further. See also Weller, supra n 54, 66. In one of the cases where the court did not take account of the reasons for the Hague non-return order this is because the reasons were unclear from the documentation which only referred to
Article 13 and not a specific provision. 157 Where this happens it is impossible for the judge to 155 See Beaumont et al, supra n 8, 131. 156 In Italy the parties are notified of the proceedings through a written note which is delivered to the last known address, but this does not need to follow the formalities for service of documents (see the Italian report for more details). As long as somebody at the address takes the document then it is presumed that it has been properly served. If one of the parties wants to argue that they did not receive notice of the proceedings, the burden of proof lies on them to show that the document was not actually delivered. 157 It has been reported that Polish orders do not always contain the reasons for non-return.
take account of the reasons behind the non-return order. Judges have also had problems identifying whether the non-return was on the basis of Article 3 or Article 13(1)(a), consent.
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In the case where it is given as a 'mixture' this is based on information given by the French Central Authority. The Central Authority explained that this was because the judgment indicates that the judge has taken account of some of the reasons and refers to later developments in Portugal, however the Portuguese judge did not hear the child who was 14 years old, had been heard by the French authorities, and expressed her fears of being returned to Portugal. 159 The information indicates that judges are generally taking account of the reasons for non-return, as far as they can, but this can be hindered by unclear judgments or a failure to hear all the parties during the Article 11(6)- (8) proceedings.
Details of measures to ensure the protection of the child
The final component of the certificate is that it should contain details of any protective measures taken. Unlike the other parts where judges can currently just state "yes" or "no", it is
clear from the text of the Regulation that the judge should include the details in the certificate:
"the certificate shall contain details of such measures". 160 It is unclear whether this is happening as access to certificates is limited, because they are not appended to the reported judgments, and information was not sought on this aspect in the questionnaires. One certificate that we have access to indicates that this might not be happening, because although some protective measures were given in the order the certificate just states "YES", at point 14. 161 The lack of information available means that no clear conclusions can be drawn on this aspect, however an overall assessment suggests that Article 42 certificates are not always completed adequately and adjustments will be needed in a revised Regulation, with the aim of making the information provided more reliable. The information above indicates that the Article 42 certificate is not necessarily a reliable document and therefore the inability to review the certificate is flawed. Instead the judgment referred to in the certificate should not be automatically enforceable in the State of refuge, it should be reviewable on the basis of fundamental rights. 163 Where the judgment is appropriately reasoned and the certificate is completed adequately, conforming to the proposed requirements, it should be able to stand up to such a review.
E. Further concerns
The article has highlighted several issues surrounding the Article 11(6)- (8) procedure. This section will now consider some other factors linked to these issues, which may already have been touched upon briefly, in further detail.
Central Authorities
One issue has been the difficulty in tracing Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa cases. This is because these cases do not need to go through Central Authorities, and the Hague decision on nonreturn can be transmitted directly to the relevant court. 164 This is presumably so that in cases where custody proceedings are already ongoing, the court in the State of refuge can send the documents directly to the court already dealing with the case. 165 Without taking away this possibility of direct judicial communication, it would also be useful if any documents sent were 163 Although this would need to be approved unanimously by Council (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art 81(3)), so it is unlikely, it is clear that the certificate does not work in its current form and changes are needed. For arguments in favour of the need for at least fundamental rights review in intra-EU private international law cases see P Beaumont and E Johnston, "Can exequatur be abolished in Brussels I whilst retaining a public policy defence?" (2010 166 In AF, the judge involved the Central Authorities in the Article 11(6)-(8) proceedings in order to try and facilitate the hearing of the mother and child in Germany through the German Authorities. 167 The continued involvement of Central Authorities during the Article 11(6)-(8) process would allow them to collect complete data on child abduction proceedings including the number of applications that resulted in Article 11(6)- (8) proceedings.
This can then be reported to the Commission which will help them to complete their impact assessment, using reliable data, the next time the Regulation is to be revised. This will only be possible if Central Authorities are required to have an electronic database which collects this information. It would be preferable if the Commission designed their own database, or informed Central Authorities of the specific information they require, so that all Central
Authorities can generate comparable information. 168 The Central Authority personnel should then be under an obligation to provide this information to relevant bodies. The collection of this information is important if impact assessments are going to be useful and reviews are to be well informed.
In order for Central Authorities to be effective it is important that they have access to suitable resources and they are adequately staffed. If Central Authorities are utilised properly and have these resources, such as an in-house lawyer and video-conference equipment, 169 they should be able to increase access to justice for the parties involved in these proceedings. 180 It is also noted that the increase in litigants in person means that judges are regularly faced with litigants who are ill-prepared and therefore proceedings take at least twice as long, again resulting in increased court time and greater expense (information provided by county court judges in Brighton and Stoke) and see G Cookson, supra n 178, 29-30. 181 In some situations this would simply allow parties to seek a relocation order, which would mean that there wouldn't even have to be any abduction proceedings at all.
Legal aid
has been a regular finding in our study, 182 in cases where proceedings have been ongoing for a long period of time. Decisions on urgent measures for access (contact), should fall under a revised Article 20 of Brussels IIa. The left-behind parent should be able to make use of such orders without being accused of submitting to the jurisdiction. This is essential if the relationship between the child and the left-behind parent is to be protected.
Article 11 of the 1996 Convention currently provides a useful tool to enable the courts of the country to which the child has been abducted to award interim access (contact) to the left-behind parent in the country where the child has been abducted to while the child abduction proceedings are pending. 183 Given that these proceedings should be expeditious these access provisions should not be long lasting, but even in a few months it would be detrimental to the child if he or she could not have contact in person with the left-behind parent wherever that is practically possible (and of course contact by phone or internet video should always be possible).
Enforcement proceedings in the State of refuge
During the course of the study some points arose in relation to enforcement which deserve further analysis. The Latvian implementing law (amended in 2011) on the Hague Convention contains special rules on enforcement. 184 The rules allow the enforcement officers (bailiffs) to collect children from school or kindergarten and place them in a protected children's home until the other parent can come and collect the children. They also require the parent seeking enforcement to pay for enforcement. 185 The cost of enforcement includes set fees and then other fees (dependant on the action taken) and a full deposit is required.
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In one case, 187 where an Article 42 certificate was issued, the left-behind parent had qualified for legal aid in England for all proceedings, 188 therefore his income must have been minimal. The Latvian authorities did not receive the certificate until after the date on which the return order was due to be enforced. They attempted to contact the applicant on a number of occasions but he did not respond so they could not proceed with enforcement. 189 It is extremely important to have effective enforcement measures, however if the applicant cannot afford to pay for them it essentially deems the earlier proceedings (and outlay) pointless unless one of the States is willing to cover the costs of enforcement. The case law of the ECtHR suggests that Member State authorities' must take all steps necessary to facilitate the execution of the judgment that can reasonably be demanded in the specific circumstances of the case. 190 It is unclear whether not taking any steps because the applicant has not yet paid for enforcement, will be considered to be proportionate, or whether it would be a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 191 It is clear however that the non-enforcement of orders, just because an applicant is unable to cover the cost of enforcement, hinders effective access to justice across the EU.
The other issue is whether a finding of consent, means that the removal is no longer wrongful, or if appearance in public child protection proceedings and issuing residence proceedings in the State of refuge amounts to acquiescence in that court's jurisdiction. 192 These issues were discussed in a Belgium -UK case, 193 where the English courts had refused to return courts in the State of origin of the minimum standards of the contents of the certificate, 213 but it in no way empowers the court in the State of enforcement to review these conditions. 214 This renders the certificate virtually pointless if the judgment is enforceable even where the requirements are clearly not met, and in most other cases they are only met superficially. Judges in the State of enforcement should be able to disapply the certificate thereby removing the automatic enforceability of the judgment where the requirements that the Regulation imposes, on the face of the certificate, are clearly not met, and in other cases should be able to review the judgment and certificate on human rights grounds.
F. Conclusion
The research project has indicated that there are problems with the Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels
IIa procedure and that return orders given under Article 11(8) are rarely ever implemented, either through legal enforcement or otherwise. The procedure often gives false hope to leftbehind parents, is only accessible to those who are made aware of the procedure by solicitors or other organisations, and in some countries legal aid is limited so even those aware of the procedure might not be able to utilise it. The procedure also increases animosity between the parents, prolongs the period of instability for the child, and can delay contact between the child and the left-behind parent. Consequently the overall conclusion is that the procedure should be removed from a revised Brussels IIa. Unfortunately it is highly unlikely that this will happen because such a change would have to be approved unanimously by the Council. 215 Therefore several recommendations have been made with the hope of improving the procedure and creating greater access to justice in these proceedings.
It is recommended that Povse is reversed and the text of the Regulation is followed, in order to ensure that Article 11(8) return orders accompanied by Article 42 certificates are only issued following a full welfare enquiry and not in relation to summary proceedings. Article 11(8) proceedings should be restricted to Hague non-return orders based on Article 13(1)(b).
There should also be several changes made to the Article 42 certificate and judgments given under Article 11(8). Judges should be more accountable and should be required to state clearly:
1) what opportunities to be heard were made available to the parties and the child, 2) where the 213 Aguirre Zarraga supra n 58, para 53. 214 Ibid, para 54. 215 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art 81(3). (including video-conferencing), which will assist Central Authorities providing important data, and to have sufficient staff including some that are legally qualified. Member States should also be required to ensure that their enforcement laws in relation to enforcing the return of an abducted child are effective and appropriate for children and that legal aid is provided where a party is unable to pay enforcement fees.
